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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) system consisting of one source, one destination
and one eavesdropper, where each node is equipped with an
arbitrary number of antennas. To improve the security of source-
destination transmissions, we investigate the antenna selection
at the source and propose the optimal antenna selection (OAS)
and suboptimal antenna selection (SAS) schemes, depending on
whether the source node has the global channel state information
(CSI) of both the main link (from source to destination) and
wiretap link (from source to eavesdropper). Also, the traditional
space-time transmission (STT) is studied as a benchmark. We
evaluate the secrecy performance of STT, SAS, and OAS schemes
in terms of the probability of zero secrecy capacity. Furthermore,
we examine the generalized secrecy diversity of STT, SAS, and
OAS schemes through an asymptotic analysis of the probability
of zero secrecy capacity, as the ratio between the average gains of
the main and wiretap channels tends to infinity. This is different
from the conventional secrecy diversity which assumes an infinite
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) received at the destination under the
condition that the eavesdropper has a finite received SNR. It is
shown that the generalized secrecy diversity orders of STT, SAS,
and OAS schemes are the product of the number of antennas at
source and destination. Additionally, numerical results show that
the proposed OAS scheme strictly outperforms both the STT and
SAS schemes in terms of the probability of zero secrecy capacity.
Index Terms—MIMO, antenna selection, space-time code,
eavesdropping attack, secrecy diversity.
I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, theradio signal of a source node can be overheard by
any unauthorized user within its transmit coverage, which
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makes the wireless communications vulnerable to eavesdrop-
ping attacks. In order to achieve secure wireless transmissions,
cryptographic techniques have been widely used to ensure that
the confidential information can be decoded by the legitimate
receiver only while preventing an eavesdropper from the
interception. In addition to the conventional cryptographic
techniques, physical-layer security is now emerging as a new
secure communication paradigm by exploiting the physical
characteristics of wireless channels to prevent the eavesdropper
from intercepting the information exchange between legitimate
users.
Physical-layer security work was pioneered by Shannon
[1] and later extended by Wyner [2], where an information-
theoretic framework has been established by developing
achievable secrecy rates for a classical three-node scenario
consisting of source, destination and eavesdropper. More
specifically, Wyner showed that when the main channel span-
ning from source to destination has a better conditional than
the wiretap channel from source to eavesdropper, there exists a
positive rate at which the source and destination can communi-
cate reliably and securely. In [3], Wyner’s results were further
extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel, where the secrecy
capacity is shown as the difference between the capacity of
the main channel and that of the wiretap channel.
A. Related Literature
It is known that the wireless capacity is severely degraded
due to the channel fading effect. To this end, multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) was proposed as an effective means
to combat wireless fading and improve channel capacity [4],
[5], which also has great potential to increase the secrecy
capacity of wireless transmissions and enhance the wireless
physical-layer security. In [6] and [7], the secrecy capacity of
multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel was ex-
amined and characterized in terms of generalized eigenvalues.
In [8], the authors studied the maximal achievable rates of
MIMO wiretap channel and proposed a generalized-singular-
value-decomposition (GSVD) scheme to achieve the secrecy
capacity. In [9], the MIMO broadcast wiretap channel was
investigated from an information-theoretic perspective in terms
of the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, in [10]-[12], the secrecy
capacity of wiretap channel in wireless fading environments
was examined and evaluated by using optimal power and rate
allocation strategies. In addition, user cooperation [13]-[15] as
virtual MIMO by allowing users to share each other’s antennas
was shown in [16] and [17] to improve the wireless secrecy
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capacity. For example, in [19], we studied cooperative relay
selection for securing wireless communications and demon-
strated that the wireless physical-layer security significantly
improves with an increasing number of relays. In [20] and
[21], multiuser scheduling was shown as a promising approach
to protect cognitive radio networks against eavesdropping.
Recently, extensive efforts have been devoted to the research
of transmit antenna selection for the wireless physical-layer
security. In [22], the authors explored the transmit antenna
selection for a MISO communication system consisting of
a multiple-antenna transmitter and a single-antenna receiver
in the presence of a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. It was
shown in [22] that the transmit antenna selection considerably
enhances the wireless security in terms of secrecy outage prob-
ability. Later on, the antenna selection work of [22] was further
extended in [23] and [24] to a MIMO communication system
comprised of a source, a destination and an eavesdropper, each
equipped with multiple antennas. Closed-form expressions of
the secrecy outage probability were derived in [23] and [24] for
the transmit antenna selection assisted MIMO communications
in fading environments. In [25], the impact of outdated channel
state information (CSI) on the transmit antenna selection was
examined for a MISO system, showing that the secrecy outage
performance expectedly degrades when the CSI obtained at the
transmitter is outdated due to the CSI feedback delay.
It is worth mentioning that all the aforementioned studies
[22]-[25] assume only the CSI of the main channel available
at the transmitter without knowing the eavesdropper’s CSI
knowledge. The transmit antenna selection with the global CSI
of both the main channel and wiretap channel was analyzed in
[26], which, however, is limited to the performance evaluation
of a simple MISO system only in terms of the average secrecy
rate. The performance of optimal antenna selection with the
global CSI knowledge remains unknown for MIMO commu-
nication systems, which will provide a theoretical upper bound
as a guide for developing new approaches to defend against
eavesdropping attacks. Additionally, in existing literature (e.g.
[23], [24], [27] and [29]), the secrecy diversity was established
and analyzed by assuming that the average received signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) at the destination tends to infinity, while
the eavesdropper’s received SNR is finite. As an alternative,
we presented a generalized secrecy diversity definition in
[19]-[21] for characterizing an asymptotic behavior on the
secrecy performance, as the ratio between the average gains
of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s wiretap channel
approaches infinity, called main-to-eavesdropper (MER) ratio.
To the best of our knowledge, it is still an open issue to
examine our generalized secrecy diversity for the transmit
antenna selection assisted MIMO communications in the face
of an eavesdropper.
B. Motivation and Contribution
As aforementioned, no previous work addresses the optimal
antenna selection with the global CSI knowledge of both the
main channel and wiretap channel for MIMO communication
systems, where the source, destination and eavesdropper are
equipped with an arbitrary number of antennas. It has been
shown in [3] and [9] that the secrecy capacity of MIMO com-
munications is given by the difference between the capacity
of the main channel and that of the wiretap channel. To be
specific, when the main channel has a better quality than the
wiretap channel, a positive secrecy capacity is achieved and
the source can transmit at a non-zero rate to the destination
reliably and securely. However, if the main channel is a
degraded version of the wiretap channel, then the secrecy
capacity becomes zero and an event of zero secrecy capacity
occurs. In this case, the source and destination cannot transmit
reliably and securely, which is referred to as an intercept
event in [19]. This paper is focused on deriving analytical
expressions of the probability of zero secrecy capacity for
transmit antenna selection aided MIMO communications in
Rayleigh fading environments. Also, we examine the general-
ized secrecy diversity [19]-[21] for MIMO communications
through an asymptotic analysis of the probability of zero
secrecy capacity in high MER region, which provides a useful
insight into the effect of the number of antennas on wireless
security against eavesdropping. The main contributions of the
paper are summarized as follow.
• We explore the transmit antenna selection for physical-
layer security of a MIMO system consisting of one source
and one destination in the presence of an eavesdropper,
where each node is equipped with an arbitrary num-
ber of antennas. The optimal antenna selection (OAS)
and suboptimal antenna selection (SAS) schemes are
proposed to improve the security of source-destination
transmissions against the eavesdropper. Specifically, in
the OAS scheme, the source is assumed to have the global
CSI knowledge of the main channel and wiretap channel,
whereas only the main channel’s CSI is known in the
SAS scheme without requiring the eavesdropper’s CSI.
As discussed above, the existing antenna selection work
(see e.g. [22]-[25]) considers that only the main channel’s
CSI is available at the source node and, moreover, the
optimal antenna selection with the global CSI knowledge
studied in [26] is constrained to a MISO scenario without
considering a more general MIMO system. For compar-
ison purposes, we also consider the conventional space-
time transmission (STT) as a benchmark.
• We consider the probability of zero secrecy capacity as a
metric to evaluate the security performance of STT, SAS
and OAS schemes. To be specific, an event of the zero
secrecy capacity occurs when the capacity of the main
channel spanning from the source to the destination falls
below the capacity of the wiretap channel from the source
to the eavesdropper. In this case, the eavesdropper would
be able to succeed in intercepting the source-destination
transmission. The probability of zero secrecy capacity
is thus to evaluate the probability that the physical-
layer security cannot be achieved. We derive analytical
expressions of the probability of zero secrecy capacity
for the STT, SAS and OAS schemes. It is shown that the
probabilities of zero secrecy capacity for the STT, SAS
and OAS schemes are independent of the SNR, implying
that increasing the transmit power cannot improve the
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Fig. 1. A multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system consisting of one
source (s) and one destination (d) in the presence of an eavesdropper (e).
wireless security in terms of the probability of zero
secrecy capacity.
• We examine the use of our generalized secrecy diversity
[19]-[21] to characterize an asymptotic behavior on the
probability of zero secrecy capacity, as the MER tends to
infinity. It needs to be pointed out that as aforementioned,
the probability of zero secrecy capacity is independent
of the SNR, which makes the conventional SNR based
secrecy diversity (e.g. [23], [24], [27] and [29]) becomes
not applicable here. By contrast, our generalized secrecy
diversity attempts to show an asymptotic probability of
zero secrecy capacity in high MER region, which is
motivated by the fact that the probability of zero secrecy
capacity is mainly determined by the average gains of
main and wiretap channels. Using our generalized secrecy
diversity definition, we obtain that the STT, SAS and
OAS schemes achieve the full diversity order of MNd,
where M and Nd represent the number of antennas at
source and destination, respectively. This coincidentally
matches the conventional secrecy diversity result of [23].
It is also implied that the secrecy diversity performance
of STT, SAS and OAS schemes is independent of the
number of eavesdropper’s antennas.
C. Organization and Structure
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model and presents the STT, SAS, and
OAS schemes. Next, we conduct the performance analysis of
the STT, SAS and OAS schemes in terms of the probability of
zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy diversity in Section III,
followed by Section IV, where numerical results are evaluated
to show the security advantage of proposed antenna selection
over conventional space-time coding. Finally, we make some
concluding remarks in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless MIMO system
consisting of a source (s) and a destination (d) in the presence
of an eavesdropper (e), in which the solid and dash lines
represent the main channel (from source to destination) and
the wiretap link (from source to eavesdropper), respectively. In
Fig. 1, each network node is equipped with an arbitrary num-
ber of antennas, where M , Nd and Ne represent the number of
antennas at the source, destination and eavesdropper, respec-
tively. Moreover, the sets of antennas at the source, destination
and eavesdropper are denoted by S, D and E , respectively.
Additionally, both the main and wiretap channels are modeled
as the Rayleigh fading and the thermal noise received at any
node is modeled as a zero-mean complex Gaussian random
variable (RV) with a variance of σ2n, i.e., CN (0, σ2n). Although
only the Rayleigh fading model is considered in this paper,
similar performance analysis and results could be obtained for
other fading models e.g. Nakagami fading.
In MIMO communications systems, space-time coding [30]
has been widely recognized as an effective means to improve
the performance of wireless transmissions. In what follows,
we first consider the space-time transmission (STT) as a
benchmark and then examine the transmit antenna selection
to improve the physical-layer security for MIMO systems. We
present two antenna selection schemes, namely the optimal
antenna selection (OAS) and suboptimal antenna selection
(SAS), which operate depending on whether or not the global
CSI of both the main and wiretap channels is available at the
source. To be specific, in the OAS scheme, the global CSI is
known at the source, whereas only the main channel’s CSI is
assumed in the SAS scheme without knowing eavesdropper’s
CSI.
A. STT Scheme
In the STT scheme, the source signal is first encoded by
using space-time coding [30]. Then, all M transmit antennas
participate in sending the encoded signal to the destination,
where the total amount of transmit power across M antennas
is constrained to a fixed value i.e. P . For simplicity, we here
consider an equal-power allocation method, leading to the
transmit power of P/M for each transmit antenna. Assuming
that the destination has the perfect CSI of the main channel
for space-time decoding [30], the receive signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at the destination relying on the STT scheme can be
given by
γSTTd =
M∑
i=1
Nd∑
j=1
P |hidj |
2
Mσ2n
, (1)
where hidj is a fading coefficient of the main channel from
transmit antenna i of the source to receive antenna j of the
destination. Thus, according to (1), the maximal achievable
rate of the source-to-destination transmission relying on the
STT scheme is expressed as
RSTTsd = log2(1 + γ
STT
d ). (2)
Similarly, the maximal achievable rate at the eavesdropper
with STT scheme can be given by
RSTTse = log2(1 + γ
STT
e ), (3)
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where γSTTe represents the receive SNR at the eavesdropper as
given by
γSTTe =
M∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
P |hiej |
2
Mσ2n
, (4)
where hiej is a fading coefficient of the wiretap channel from
transmit antenna i to receive antenna j of the eavesdropper.
B. OAS Scheme
In the OAS scheme, only the “best” transmit antenna will
be selected and used for transmitting the source signal to the
destination. We here assume that the source node has the
global CSI of both the main and wiretap channels, where
the CSI of wiretap channel may be estimated and obtained
by monitoring the eavesdropper’s transmissions [12], [17].
Notice that the eavesdropper could be a legitimate user who is
interested in tapping other users’ signals, which may be active
in the network. It is pointed out that the following subsection
will address the scenario, where the wiretap channel’s CSI
is unavailable at the source. Without loss of generality, let
us consider that the transmit antenna i is selected as the
“best” antenna to transmit the source signal with power P .
Considering the use of maximal ratio combining (MRC) at
the destination, we can obtain the maximal achievable rate of
the transmission from transmit antenna i to destination as
Rid = log2(1 +
Nd∑
j=1
P |hidj |
2
σ2n
). (5)
Similarly, the maximal achievable rate obtained at the eaves-
dropper is given by
Rie = log2(1 +
Ne∑
j=1
P |hiej |
2
σ2n
). (6)
Obviously, the transmit antenna that maximizes the secrecy
capacity can be viewed as the “best” antenna. As discussed in
[3] and [9], the secrecy capacity is given by the difference
between the capacity of the main channel and that of the
wiretap channel. Thus, the optimal antenna selection criterion
can be given by
b = argmax
i∈S
(Rid −Rie) = argmax
i∈S
1 +
Nd∑
j=1
P |hidj |
2
σ2n
1 +
Ne∑
j=1
P |hiej |
2
σ2n
, (7)
where b denotes the “best” antenna and S represents a set of
M transmit antennas at the source node. Note that the transmit
power P in (7) is known at the source. Moreover, the thermal
noise variance σ2n is shown as σ2n = κTB [33], where κ is
the Boltzmann constant (i.e., κ = 1.38× 10−23Joule/Kelvin),
T is the room temperature in Kelvin, and B is the system
bandwidth in Hz. Since both the room temperature T and
system bandwidth B are predetermined, the noise variance σ2n
can be easily obtained at the source. Therefore, once the global
CSI of the main and wiretap channels |hidj |2 and |hiej |2 are
available, the “best” antenna could be determined at the source
by using (7).
C. SAS Scheme
As aforementioned, the OAS scheme requires that the global
CSI of both the main and wiretap channels is available at the
source node. However, in some cases where the eavesdropper’s
CSI is unavailable, the OAS scheme cannot work properly.
To this end, this subsection presents a so-called suboptimal
antenna selection (SAS) scheme, in which the “best” transmit
antenna would be the one that maximizes the channel capacity
of the source-destination transmission, instead of maximizing
the secrecy capacity. Therefore, the antenna selection criterion
in SAS scheme is expressed as
b = argmax
i∈S
Rid = argmax
i∈S
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2, (8)
where b denotes the selected “best” transmit antenna. Mean-
while, considering the SAS scheme, the maximal achievable
rate at the eavesdropper is given by
RSASbe = log2(1 +
Ne∑
j=1
P |hbej |
2
σ2n
). (9)
We now complete the signal modeling of the STT, OAS and
SAS schemes.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we carry out performance analysis for the
STT, OAS and SAS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels.
We first derive closed-form expressions of the probability
of zero secrecy capacity for these three schemes. Next, the
generalized secrecy diversity analysis is conducted for the
sake of providing an insight into the impact of the number of
antennas on the probability of zero secrecy capacity in high
MER region.
A. Probability of Zero Secrecy Capacity
As discussed above, if the capacity of the main channel
falls below that of the wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity
becomes zero and thus an event of zero secrecy capacity
happens. Accordingly, the probability of zero secrecy capacity
is defined as follows.
Definition 1: Letting Rm and Rw, respectively, denote the
achievable rates of the main channel and wiretap channel,
then the probability of zero secrecy capacity is obtained as
PzeroSC = Pr {Rm < Rw} . (10)
1) STT Scheme: Let us first analyze the probability of zero
secrecy capacity for the STT scheme. By using (2) and (3),
the probability of zero secrecy capacity for the STT scheme
is given by
P STTzeroSC = Pr
{
RSTTsd < R
STT
se
}
= Pr


M∑
i=1

 Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 −
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2

 < 0

 . (11)
For simplicity, we consider the case, where the fading coeffi-
cients of all main links |hidj |2 (i ∈ S, j ∈ D) are independent
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and identically distributed (i.i.d.) RVs with the same average
channel gain denoted by σ2sd = E
(
|hidj |
2
)
. Moreover, the
fading coefficients of all wiretap links |hiej |2 (i ∈ S, j ∈ E)
are also assumed to be i.i.d. RVs with an average channel gain
denoted by σ2se = E
(
|hiej |
2
)
. For notational convenience, let
λde denote the ratio of σ2sd to σ2se, i.e., λde = σ2sd/σ2se that is
referred to as the MER throughout this paper. Since |hidj |2 and
|hiej |
2 are assumed to be i.i.d. with exponential distribution,
then
M∑
i=1
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 and
M∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2 are two independent
Gamma random variables. Using [32], a closed-form solution
to (11) is obtained as
P STTzeroSC =(1 + λde)
1−MNd−MNe
×
MNe−1∑
k=0
(
MNd +MNe − 1
k
)
λkde.
(12)
In addition, considering
M∑
i=1
[
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 −
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2
]
≤M ·
max
i∈S
[
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 −
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2
]
, we obtain a lower bound on
the probability of zero secrecy capacity of (11) as given by
P STTzeroSC ≥ Pr

M maxi∈S

 Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 −
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2

 < 0


=
M∏
i=1
Pr


Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 <
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2

.
(13)
It is worth mentioning that the lower bound as given in
(13) is an exact probability of zero secrecy capacity for the
OAS scheme, as will be shown in the following subsection.
This theoretically shows that the probability of zero secrecy
capacity for the proposed OAS scheme is strictly lower than
that of the conventional STT scheme, showing the security
benefit of using the OAS scheme.
2) OAS Scheme: In this subsection, we analyze the proba-
bility of zero secrecy capacity for the proposed OAS scheme.
Denoting the maximal achievable rates of the transmission
from the “best” transmit antenna to the destination and to the
eavesdropper by ROASbd and ROASbe , respectively, we can express
the probability of zero secrecy capacity for the OAS scheme
as
POASzeroSC = Pr
{
ROASbd < R
OAS
be
}
, (14)
where ROASbd and ROASbe are given by
ROASbd = log2(1 +
Nd∑
j=1
|hbdj |
2P
σ2n
), (15)
and
ROASbe = log2(1 +
Ne∑
j=1
|hbej |
2P
σ2n
). (16)
Substituting ROASbd and ROASbe from (15) and (16) into (14)
yields
POASzeroSC = Pr


1 +
Nd∑
j=1
|hbdj |
2P
σ2n
1 +
Ne∑
j=1
|hbej |
2P
σ2n
< 1


. (17)
Combining (7) and (17) gives
POASzeroSC = Pr


max
i∈S


1 +
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2P
σ2n
1 +
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2P
σ2n

 < 1


, (18)
which can be further obtained as
POASzeroSC =
M∏
i=1
Pr


1 +
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2P
σ2n
1 +
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2P
σ2n
< 1


=
M∏
i=1
Pr


Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 <
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2

,
(19)
which is exactly the same as the STT scheme’s lower bound
on the probability of zero secrecy capacity as given by (13),
confirming the security advantage of the OAS scheme over
the STT scheme. Assume that the fading coefficients |hidj |2
and |hiej |2 are i.i.d. exponential RVs with respective average
channel gains σ2sd and σ2se. Following [32], we obtain a closed-
form expression of (19) as
POASzeroSC =(1 + λde)
M(1−Nd−Ne)
×
[
Ne−1∑
k=0
(
Nd +Ne − 1
k
)
λkde
]M
.
(20)
3) SAS Scheme: This subsection presents the probability of
zero secrecy capacity analysis of the SAS scheme. As shown
in (8), the SAS scheme attempts to maximize the capacity of
the main channel spanning from source to destination. Hence,
using (8) and (9), we obtain the probability of zero secrecy
capacity for the SAS scheme as
P SASzeroSC = Pr
{
RSASbd < R
SAS
be
}
= Pr


Nd∑
j=1
|hbdj |
2 <
Ne∑
j=1
|hbej |
2


=
M∑
m=1
Pr


Nd∑
j=1
|hmdj |
2 <
Ne∑
j=1
|hmej |
2, b = m

,
(21)
where b denotes the “best” antenna determined by (8) and the
last equation is obtained by using the law of total probability.
From (8), an event b = m means
Nd∑
j=1
|hmdj |
2 > max
i∈S,i6=m
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2, (22)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 6
substituting which into (21) gives
P SASzeroSC =
M∑
m=1
Pr


Ne∑
j=1
|hmej |
2 >
Nd∑
j=1
|hmdj |
2,
max
i∈S,i6=m
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 <
Nd∑
j=1
|hmdj |
2


.
(23)
For simplicity, we consider that the fading coefficients hiej (i ∈
S, j ∈ E) of wiretap links from M transmit antennas (at
source) to Ne receive antennas (at eavesdropper) are i.i.d. In
this way, RV
Ne∑
j=1
|hmej |
2 follows the same distribution for
different transmit antenna m (1 ≤ m ≤ M ). Thus, (23) can
be further simplified to
P SASzeroSC = Pr

maxi∈S
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 <
Ne∑
j=1
|hmej |
2

, (24)
which can be used to numerically calculate the probability of
zero secrecy capacity for the SAS scheme. As shown in (11),
(19) and (23), the probabilities of zero secrecy capacity for
the STT, OAS and SAS schemes are only related to the main
channel |hidj |2 and wiretap channel |hiej |2, which has nothing
to do with the SNR. This means that increasing the transmit
power cannot improve the wireless security in terms of the
probability of zero secrecy capacity.
B. Generalized Secrecy Diversity
In what follows, we are focused on the secrecy diversity
analysis for characterizing an asymptotic behavior on the
probability of zero secrecy capacity in high MER region. In
[23] and [24], the conventional secrecy diversity is defined as
d = − lim
SNRd→∞
logPout(SNRd)
log SNRd
, (25)
where SNRd represents the received SNR at the destination
and Pout(SNRd) represents the secrecy outage probability.
One can observe that the conventional SNR based secrecy
diversity definition is not applicable here, since the probability
of zero secrecy capacity is independent of the SNR and
only relates to the main and wiretap channels, as shown
in (11), (19) and (23). To this end, we consider the use
of our generalized secrecy diversity [19]-[21] to characterize
an asymptotic behavior on the probability of zero secrecy
capacity in high MER region. In our generalized secrecy
diversity, an asymptotic probability of zero secrecy capacity
is characterized as the ratio between the average gains of the
main channel and the eavesdropper’s wiretap channel (i.e.
MER) tends to infinity. Therefore, our generalized secrecy
diversity is defined as follows.
Definition 2: Denoting λde = σ2sd/σ2se, the generalized
secrecy diversity is given by the asymptotic ratio of the
probability of zero secrecy capacity to MER λde, yielding
d = − lim
λde→∞
log(PzeroSC)
log(λde)
. (26)
It is pointed out that the MER λde possibly approaches infinity
by mitigating the eavesdropper’s received signal using an
advanced signal processing technique, such as beamforming.
To be specific, when the beamforming is adopted, the source
node could transmit its signal in a particular direction to the
destination, so that the main channel experiences constructive
interference, whereas destructive interference is encountered
in the wiretap channel, resulting in a high MER.
1) STT Scheme: In this subsection, the secrecy diversity
analysis of STT scheme is presented. Using (26), the secrecy
diversity of STT scheme is given by
dSTT = − lim
λde→∞
log(P STTzeroSC)
log(λde)
, (27)
where P STTzeroSC is given by (11). Using the inequalities of
M∑
i=1
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 ≤ MNd max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 and
M∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2 ≥
max
i∈S,j∈E
|hiej |
2
, we can obtain a lower bound on the probability
of zero secrecy capacity of STT scheme as
P STTzeroSC ≥ Pr
{
MNd max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 < max
i∈S,j∈E
|hiej |
2
}
,
(28)
where D and E represent the sets of antennas at the destination
and eavesdropper, respectively. Denoting Xe = max
i∈S,j∈E
|hiej |
2
and considering that |hiej |2 follows exponential distribution
with mean σ2iej , we can obtain the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of Xe as
PXe(x) = 1 +
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(−1)
|Ak| exp(−
∑
i,j∈Ak
x
σ2iej
), (29)
for x ≥ 0; otherwise PXe(x) = 0 for x < 0, where
Ak represents the k-th non-empty sub-collection of MNe
elements of term exp(− x
σ2
iej
) for (i ∈ S, j ∈ E), and |Ak| is
the number of the elements in Ak. From (29), the probability
density function (PDF) of Xe can be derived as
pXe(x) =
2MNe−1∑
k=1
∑
i,j∈Ak
(−1)|Ak|+1
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
i,j∈Ak
x
σ2iej
),
(30)
for x ≥ 0. Using (28) and (30), we have
P STTzeroSC ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
∏
i∈S,j∈D
[1− exp(−
x
MNdσ2idj
)]pXe(x)dx,
(31)
where pXe(x) is given in (30).
Theorem 1: Considering a random variable x with PDF given
by (30), then the following equation holds for λde →∞
1− exp(−
x
MNdσ2idj
)
1
=
x
MNdσ2idj
,
where 1= represents an equality with probability 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Substituting (30) into (31) and using Theorem 1, we obtain
P STTzeroSC ≥
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(
1
MNd
)
MNd ∏
i∈S,j∈D
1
σ2idj
×
∫ ∞
0
∑
i,j∈Ak
(−1)|Ak|+1xMNd
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
i,j∈Ak
x
σ2iej
)dx
=
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|+1
(MNd)!
∏
i∈S,j∈D
1
σ2
idj
(
∑
i,j∈Ak
MNd
σ2iej
)
MNd
,
(32)
for λde → ∞. By denoting σ2idj = αidjσ
2
sd and σ2iej =
αiejσ
2
se, (32) can be rewritten as
P STTzeroSC ≥
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|+1(MNd)!
(
∑
i,j∈Ak
MNd
αiej
)
MNd ∏
i∈S,j∈D
αidj
(
1
λde
)MNd
(33)
where λde = σ2sd/σ2se. Thus, substituting (33) into (27) gives
dSTT ≤MNd. (34)
In addition, considering
M∑
i=1
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 ≥ max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2
and
M∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2 ≤MNe max
i∈S,j∈E
|hiej |
2
, we obtain an upper
bound on the probability of zero secrecy capacity of STT
scheme as
P STTzeroSC ≤ Pr
{
max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 < MNe max
i∈S,j∈E
|hiej |
2
}
.
(35)
Using (30) and letting λde →∞, (35) can be further obtained
expressed in closed-form as
P STTzeroSC ≤
∫ ∞
−∞
∏
i∈S,j∈D
[1− exp(−
MNex
σ2idj
)]pXe(x)dx
=
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|+1
(MNe)
MNd(MNd)!
(
∑
i,j∈Ak
1
αiej
)
MNd ∏
i∈S,j∈D
αidj
×
(
1
λde
)MNd
,
(36)
where the second equation is obtained by using 1 −
exp(−MNex
σ2
idj
)
1
= MNex
σ2
idj
with λde →∞. Substituting (36) into
(27) gives
dSTT ≥MNd. (37)
Therefore, by combining (34) and (37), the secrecy diversity
of STT scheme is readily obtained as
dSTT = MNd. (38)
One can observe from (38) that the secrecy diversity of STT
scheme is the product of the number of transmit antennas M
and that of receive antennas at the destination Nd, which is
independent of the number of eavesdropper’s antennas Ne.
This implies that the secrecy diversity of STT scheme is
insusceptible to the eavesdropper. More specifically, although
increasing the number of eavesdropper’s antennas would defi-
nitely degrade the probability of zero secrecy capacity, it will
not affect the speed at which the probability of zero secrecy
capacity decreases as λde → ∞. Moreover, as M and Nd
increase, the secrecy diversity MNd of STT scheme increases
accordingly, meaning that increasing the number of antennas at
the source and destination can significantly improve the speed
at which the probability of zero secrecy capacity decreases as
λde →∞.
2) OAS Scheme: In this subsection, we present the secrecy
diversity analysis of proposed OAS scheme. Similarly to (27),
the secrecy diversity of OAS scheme is given by
dOAS = − lim
λde→∞
log(POASzeroSC)
log(λde)
, (39)
where POASzeroSC is given by (19). Considering inequalities
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 ≤ Ndmax
j∈D
|hidj |
2 and
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2 ≥ max
j∈E
|hiej |
2
,
a lower bound on the probability of zero secrecy capacity of
the OAS scheme is obtained as
POASzeroSC ≥
M∏
i=1
Pr
{
Ndmax
j∈D
|hidj |
2 < max
j∈E
|hiej |
2
}
. (40)
Denoting Ye = max
j∈E
|hiej |
2
, we can easily derive the PDF of
Ye as
pYe(y) =
2Ne−1∑
k=1
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2iej
), (41)
for y ≥ 0; otherwise pYe(y) = 0 for y < 0, where Bk is the
k-th non-empty subset of Ne receive antennas at eavesdropper
and |Bk| is the number of elements of set Bk. Using (40) and
(41), we have
POASzeroSC ≥
M∏
i=1
∫ ∞
0
Nd∏
j=1
[1− exp(−
y
Ndσ2idj
)]
×
2Ne−1∑
k=1
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2iej
)dy.
(42)
Considering λde →∞, we have 1− exp(− yNdσ2idj
)
1
= y
Ndσ
2
idj
by using Theorem 1. Substituting this result into (42) yields
POASzeroSC ≥
M∏
i=1
2Ne−1∑
k=1
(
1
Nd
)
Nd Nd∏
j=1
1
σ2idj
×
∫ ∞
0
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1yNd
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2iej
)dy
=
M∏
i=1


2Ne−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Bk|+1
Nd!
Nd∏
j=1
1
αidj
(
∑
j∈Bk
Nd
αiej
)
Nd

( 1λde )MNd ,
(43)
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for λde →∞. Thus, substituting (43) into (39) gives
dOAS ≤MNd. (44)
In addition, by using inequalities
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 ≥ max
j∈D
|hidj |
2
and
Ne∑
j=1
|hiej |
2 ≤ Nemax
j∈E
|hiej |
2
, an upper bound on the
probability of zero secrecy capacity of OAS scheme is given
by
POASzeroSC ≤
M∏
i=1
Pr
{
max
j∈D
|hidj |
2 < Nemax
j∈E
|hiej |
2
}
, (45)
which can be further expressed as (46) for λde → ∞ at the
top of the following page. Substituting (46) into (39) gives
dOAS ≥MNd. (47)
Using (44) and (47), we can easily obtain the secrecy diversity
of OAS scheme with the squeeze theorem as
dOAS =MNd, (48)
which shows that the OAS scheme achieves the same secrecy
diversity as the STT scheme. It is pointed out that the same
secrecy diversity order achieved by both the OAS and STT
schemes only means that the probabilities of zero secrecy
capacity of the two schemes are reduced at the same speed
as λde →∞.
3) SAS Scheme: This subsection examines the secrecy
diversity of SAS scheme. Similarly, the secrecy diversity of
SAS scheme can be defined as
dSAS = − lim
λde→∞
log(P SASzeroSC)
log(λde)
, (49)
where P SASzeroSC is given by (24). Using inequalities
max
i∈S
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 ≤ Nd max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 and
Ne∑
j=1
|hmej |
2 ≥
max
j∈E
|hmej |
2
, we obtain a lower bound on the probability of
zero secrecy capacity of SAS scheme as
P SASzeroSC ≥ Pr
{
Nd max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 < max
j∈E
|hmej |
2
}
. (50)
Letting λde →∞ and using (41), the preceding equation can
be further calculated as
P SASzeroSC ≥ Pr
{
Nd max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 < max
j∈E
|hmej |
2
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
i∈S,j∈D
[1− exp(−
y
Ndσ2idj
)]
×
2Ne−1∑
k=1
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1
σ2mej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2mej
)dy
=
2Ne−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Bk|+1
(MNd)!
∏
i∈S,j∈D
( 1
αidj
)
(
∑
j∈Bk
Nd
αmej
)MNd
(
1
λde
)MNd ,
(51)
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Fig. 2. Probability of zero secrecy capacity versus MER of the STT, SAS
and OAS schemes with αidj = αiej = 1.
where the third equation is obtained by using 1 −
exp(− y
Ndσ
2
idj
)
1
= y
Ndσ
2
idj
with λde → ∞. Substituting (51)
into (49) yields
dSAS ≤MNd. (52)
In addition, considering max
i∈S
Nd∑
j=1
|hidj |
2 ≥ max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2
and
Ne∑
j=1
|hmej |
2 ≤ Nemax
j∈E
|hmej |
2
, an upper bound on the
probability of zero secrecy capacity of SAS scheme is given
by
P SASzeroSC ≤ Pr
{
max
i∈S,j∈D
|hidj |
2 < Nemax
j∈E
|hmej |
2
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
i∈S,j∈D
[1− exp(−
Ney
σ2idj
)]
×
2Ne−1∑
k=1
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1
σ2mej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2mej
)dy
=
2Ne−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Bk|+1(Ne)
MNd(MNd)!
(
∑
j∈Bk
1
αmej
)MNd
∏
i∈S,j∈D
(αidj )
(
1
λde
)MNd ,
(53)
for λde →∞. Using (49) and (53), we have
dSAS ≥MNd. (54)
Therefore, we obtain the secrecy diversity of the SAS scheme
from (52) and (54) as
dSAS =MNd, (55)
which shows that the proposed SAS scheme achieves the
same secrecy diversity as the STT and OAS schemes. This
means that in high MER region, the probabilities of zero
secrecy capacity of STT, OAS and SAS schemes all behave
as (1/λde)
MNd as λde →∞.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical performance results of
the STT, SAS and OAS schemes in terms of the probability of
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POASzeroSC ≤
M∏
i=1
Pr
{
max
j∈D
|hidj |
2 < Nemax
j∈E
|hiej |
2
}
=
M∏
i=1
∫ ∞
0
Nd∏
j=1
[1− exp(−
Ney
σ2idj
)]
2Ne−1∑
k=1
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2iej
)dy
=
M∏
i=1
2Ne−1∑
k=1
(Ne)
Nd
Nd∏
j=1
1
σ2idj
∫ ∞
0
∑
j∈Bk
(−1)|Bk|+1yNd
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
j∈Bk
y
σ2iej
)dy
=
M∏
i=1


2Ne−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Bk|+1(Ne)
Nd
Nd!
Nd∏
j=1
1
αidj
(
∑
j∈Bk
1
αiej
)
Nd

( 1λde )MNd
(46)
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Fig. 3. Probability of zero secrecy capacity versus the number of transmit
antennas M of the STT, SAS and OAS schemes with Nd = Ne = 1,
λde = 3dB, and αidj = αiej = 1.
zero secrecy capacity. Fig. 2 shows the probability of zero se-
crecy capacity versus MER of the STT, SAS and OAS schemes
with Nd = Ne = 1 and αidj = αiej = 1. From Fig. 2, one can
see that as the number of transmit antennas M increases from
M = 2 to 4, the probabilities of zero secrecy capacity of the
STT, SAS and OAS schemes decrease significantly, showing
the security benefits of exploiting multiple transmit antennas at
the source node. Fig. 2 also illustrates that for both the cases
of M = 2 and M = 4, the OAS scheme achieves the best
security performance and moreover, the SAS scheme performs
better than the STT scheme in terms of the probability of zero
secrecy capacity.
Fig. 3 depicts the probability of zero secrecy capacity versus
of the number of transmit antennas M of the STT, SAS
and OAS schemes with Nd = Ne = 1, λde = 3dB, and
αidj = αiej = 1. It is shown from Fig. 3 that the OAS scheme
outperforms both the SAS and STT schemes in terms of its
probability of zero secrecy capacity. Moreover, as the number
of transmit antennas M increases, the security advantage of
the OAS scheme over the SAS and STT approaches become
much more significant. One can also observe from Fig. 3 that
the conventional STT scheme performs worse than both the
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Fig. 4. Probability of zero secrecy capacity versus MER of the STT, SAS
and OAS schemes with M = 4, Nd = Ne, and αidj = αiej = 1.
SAS and OAS schemes, showing the security benefits of using
the transmit antenna selection.
In Figs. 2 and 3, only the source node is assumed with mul-
tiple antennas to show the performance improvement through
using multiple transmit antennas. Next, we consider that the
destination and eavesdroppers are also equipped with multiple
antennas in evaluating the probability of zero secrecy capacity.
Fig. 4 shows the probability of zero secrecy capacity versus
MER of the STT, SAS and OAS schemes with M = 4 and
αidj = αiej = 1. It is seen from Fig. 4 that for both the
cases of (M,Nd, Ne) = (4, 1, 1) and (M,Nd, Ne) = (4, 4, 4),
the OAS scheme strictly achieves a better secrecy perfor-
mance than both the SAS and STT schemes. However, for
(M,Nd, Ne) = (4, 4, 4), as the MER increases from −10dB to
10dB, the SAS scheme initially outperforms the STT scheme
and eventually performs worse than the STT scheme in terms
of probability of zero secrecy capacity.
Fig. 5 illustrates the asymptotic and exact results on the
probability of zero secrecy capacity for the proposed OAS
scheme by plotting (20), (43) and (46) as a function of
MER λde. Specifically, the exact probability of zero secrecy
capacity for the OAS scheme is obtained using (20), while the
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Fig. 5. Asymptotic and exact results on the probability of zero secrecy
capacity for the proposed OAS scheme with M = Nd = 4, Ne = 2, and
αidj = αiej = 1.
corresponding lower and upper bounds are plotted from (43)
and (46), respectively. As shown in Fig. 5, upon increasing
the MER, the exact probability of zero secrecy capacity falls
between the lower and upper bounds. Notice that the lower and
upper bounds are based on Theorem 1, which is valid for high
MER only. Additionally, one can observe from Fig. 5 that in
high MER region, the slopes of these three performance curves
are the same, which confirms the correctness of the secrecy
diversity analysis based on the squeeze theorem.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the physical-layer security of a
MIMO system comprised of one source and one destination in
the presence of an eavesdropper, where each node is equipped
with multiple antennas. We proposed two transmit antenna
selection schemes, namely the OAS and SAS, which operate
depending on whether or not the global CSI knowledge of both
the main and wiretap channels is available at the source. For
the purpose of performance comparison, we also considered
the conventional STT scheme as a benchmark. We derived
closed-form expressions of the probability of zero secrecy
capacity for the STT, OAS and SAS schemes in Rayleigh
fading environments. We further examined the generalized
secrecy diversity of STT, SAS, and OAS schemes through an
asymptotic analysis of the probability of zero secrecy capacity
in high MER region. It was shown that the generalized secrecy
diversity orders of STT, SAS and OAS schemes are the product
of the number of antennas at the source and destination.
Additionally, numerical results demonstrated that the OAS
scheme outperforms both the SAS and STT schemes in terms
of its probability of zero secrecy capacity, confirming the
security benefits of using the optimal antenna selection against
eavesdropping.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Letting z = x
MNdσ
2
idj
and using (30), we obtain the expected
value of random variable z as
E(z) =
∫ ∞
0
2MNe−1∑
k=1
∑
i,j∈Ak
(−1)|Ak|+1x
MNdσ2idjσ
2
iej
× exp(−
∑
i,j∈Ak
x
σ2iej
)dx
=
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|+1(
∑
i,j∈Ak
σ−2iej )
−1
MNdσ2idj
.
(A.1)
Denoting σ2idj = αidjσ
2
sd and σ2iej = αiejσ
2
se and letting
λde →∞, we have
E(z) =
2MNe−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|+1(
∑
i,j∈Ak
α−2iej )
−1
MNdαidj
1
λde
, (A.2)
which shows that E(z) tends to zero as λde →∞. Meanwhile,
we can obtain the expected value of z2 as
E(z2) =
2MNe−1∑
k=1
2(−1)|Ak|+1(
∑
i,j∈Ak
α−2iej )
−2
(MNdα2idj )
2 (
1
λde
)2. (A.3)
From (A.3), one can see that E(z2) tends to zero as λde →∞.
Thus, the variance of z given by Var(z) = E(z2) − [E(z)]2
also converges to zero for λde → ∞, since both E(z) and
E(z2) approach zero as shown in (A.2) and (A.3). Considering
the fact that both mean and variance of z converge to zero
as λde → ∞, one can conclude that random variable z
approaches zero with probability 1 for λde → ∞. Here, we
use a symbol 1= to denote an equality with probability 1 as
λde →∞, i.e., we write z
1
= 0 to represent
Pr( lim
λde→∞
z = 0) = 1. (A.4)
In addition, using the Maclaurin series expansion and Cauchy’s
mean value theorem, we can easily obtain
1− exp(−z) = z +
z2
2
exp(−θ), (A.5)
where 0 < θ < z. From (A.5), we have
lim
λde→∞
1− exp(−z)− z = lim
λde→∞
z2
2
exp(−θ). (A.6)
Similar to (A.2) and (A.3), we can prove that both mean and
variance of z2 converge to zero as λde →∞, i.e., z2
1
= 0.
Meanwhile, considering 0 < exp(−θ) < 1 due to 0 < θ < z,
we obtain lim
λde→∞
z2
2 exp(−θ) = 0. Substituting this result into
(A.6) yields
1− exp(−z)− z
1
= 0. (A.7)
Using z = x
MNdσ
2
idj
and (A.7), we obtain
1− exp(−
x
MNdσ2idj
)
1
=
x
MNdσ2idj
, (A.8)
for λde →∞. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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